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ABSTRACT 
The rules of engagement in the brand-name versus generic-
drug war are rapidly changing.  Brand-name manufacturers face 
increasing competition from Canadian manufacturers of generic 
drugs, online drug companies, and Wal-Mart® Super Centers 
deciding to cash in by turning a piece of the generic prescription 
drug business into a huge marketing campaign with offerings of 
generic drugs for four dollar prescriptions. Other discount drug 
providers are likely to follow suit in hopes of boosting customer 
traffic and sales of their generic drugs.  Now, more than ever 
before, attorneys representing owners of pharmaceutical patents 
need to be creative with their damages theories to maximize 
recovery and help their clients recoup the investments in 
research and development necessary to bring new and 
innovative drugs to the marketplace.  This article suggests a 
novel theory of willful infringement to assist a patent owner in 
recovering treble damages and attorneys’ fees. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Allegations of willful patent infringement frequently take center 
stage in patent litigation, offering treble damages2 and attorneys’ fees3 to 
patent owners eager to turn actual damages into a windfall.  From a 
patent owner’s perspective, the possibility of recovering treble damages 
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2 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (A “court may increase the damages up to three times 
the amount found or assessed.”). 
3 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006) (“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable 
attorney fees to the prevailing party.”). 
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and attorneys’ fees may tip the scales in favor of enforcing its patent in 
an infringement lawsuit. 
¶2 Do allegations of willfulness apply with equal force, or even 
apply at all, in the context of brand-name versus generic-drug litigation?  
The answer may depend on whether a party finds itself enforcing patents 
or defending against them.  While patent owners attempted to assert 
willfulness allegations, generic-drug companies argued with some 
success that willfulness damages should not apply under the complex and 
conflicting wording of the Hatch-Waxman Act.4 
¶3 More than two decades ago, Congress passed the Hatch-
Waxman Act, which allowed generic-drug companies to obtain approval 
by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to market generic drugs 
that were therapeutically equivalent to previously-approved drugs of 
brand-name manufacturers shown to be safe and effective.  According to 
the approval process under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the generic company 
could rely on the safety and efficacy data submitted by the brand-name 
manufacturer to the FDA, which greatly expedited the approval process 
for generic companies.5  The authoritative reference for FDA-approved 
drugs, and any patents listed as covering those drugs, is referred to as the 
“Orange Book.”6 
¶4 Since the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act, brand-name 
pharmaceutical companies and their generic competitors have clashed in 
courts, with each party simultaneously asserting different legal strategies 
in an attempt to leverage benefits provided them in the intricate and 
oftentimes contradictory language of the legislation.  But, patent owners 
litigating in the hotly contested fights involving patent-protected 
pharmaceuticals and generic drugs failed to consider the “Orange Book” 
as a tool for pleading constructive notice of a patent and thereby 
acquiring an earlier date from which actual damages accrue—even 
                                                     
4 The Hatch-Waxman Act was passed in 1984.  The Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified 
as 21 U.S.C. § 355 et seq. (2006), 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006), and 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(e) (2006)).   
5 Brand-name manufacturers may also seek approval under this abbreviated 
process set forth in the Hatch-Waxman Act. 
6 The Orange Book includes certain information provided by the brand-name 
manufacturer, who is required to list all patent numbers and expiration dates for 
“any patent which claims the drug for which the applicant submitted the 
application or which claims a method of using such drug and with respect to 
which a claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted if a person 
not licensed by the owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug.”  
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2006). 
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though generic-drug manufacturers are obliged to consult the Orange 
Book.  Furthermore, patent owners overlooked the potential for pleading 
the Orange Book as a basis of showing actual notice of a patent and, as a 
consequence, possibly proving an intentional violation of the statutory 
duty to consult the Orange Book, objectively reckless disregard of 
standards of commercial behavior under the Hatch-Waxman Act 
requiring a reasonable respect for the intellectual property rights listed in 
the Orange Book, and ultimately a case of willful infringement. 
¶5 Willfulness based on Orange Book notice of a patent is no 
ordinary theory.  Rather, this theory is one of first impression with a 
proverbial clean slate on which creative theories may be written.  In its 
much-anticipated recent en banc decision on willful infringement,7 the 
Federal Circuit endorsed the view that left to district courts the 
opportunity to develop8 the law that governs the evidence necessary to 
prove willful infringement, and cited as one factor the “standards of 
commerce.”9  In the same decision, Circuit Judge Newman observed:  
“Industrial innovation would falter without the order that patent property 
contributes to the complexities of investment in technologic R & D and 
commercialization in a competitive marketplace.  The loser would be not 
only the public, but also the nation’s economic vigor.”10 
¶6 Without binding law to the contrary, and with support from this 
recent Federal Circuit decision, the possibility of pleading a new theory 
is appealing to lawyers serving clients who understandably want to 
maximize patent damages.  After all, today’s patent damages may help to 
offset current operating expenses, underwrite tomorrow’s research 
budget, and add to future innovations for pioneering drugs. 
¶7 Never in the history of pharmaceutical patent litigation has the 
need for treble damages and attorneys’ fees mattered as much as now.  
The 2007 survey published by the American Intellectual Property Law 
Association affirms what patent owners and attorneys knew all along:  
patent litigation is expensive.11  Particularly when actual damages might 
                                                     
7 In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).  
8 Id. at 1371, 1385.  
9 Id. at 1371 n.5.  
10 Id. at 1385 (Newman, J., concurring). 
11 The Law Practice Management Committee of the American Intellectual 
Property Law Association (AIPLA) conducts an economic survey every two 
years relating to, among other things, the costs of patent litigation.  The most 
recent survey from July 2007 found that attorneys’ fees could top $600,000 
when $1 million is at stake, while those fees could top $2.5 million and even top 
$5.0 million when the damages at issue are in excess of $1 million and $25 
million, respectively.  American Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n, REPORT OF THE 
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be low, the possibility of treble damages and attorneys’ fees is critical to 
a plaintiff’s competitive edge.12  Indeed, the cost of patent litigation 
drives pharmaceutical clients to demand agility from their patent counsel 
with creative legal pleading and an ability to introduce theories for 
augmenting recovery. 
¶8 Will plaintiffs’ attorneys nourish the emerging theories based on 
using the “Orange Book” to prove both notice of a patent and objective 
recklessness for purposes of actual damages and willfulness?  Or will 
defense attorneys successfully quash such novel notice theories before 
the Federal Circuit? 
¶9 Section I provides a background discussion on the law of willful 
infringement.  Section II explores the statutory and regulatory schemes 
under which the Orange Book was created and became law pursuant to 
the Hatch-Waxman Act.  Also, Section II constructs an analysis that 
might prove useful in asserting, or defending against, allegations that the 
Orange Book satisfies the notice requirement under the marking statute, 
notice sufficient to trigger willful infringement, and objective 
recklessness based on the deliberate failure to comply with a statutory 
duty or standards of fair commerce.  Section III offers suggestions of 
how the novel Orange Book theory would apply to lawsuits brought 
under the Hatch-Waxman Act or traditional infringement actions. 
I. WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT AND PATENT DAMAGES 
¶10 In order to understand the risks of treble damages and attorneys’ 
fees that may be awarded based on a finding of willfulness, one must 
understand the different ways a defendant may receive “notice” of an 
asserted patent.  Indeed, the Federal Circuit draws a significant 
                                                                                                                       
ECONOMIC SURVEY 25–26 (2007).  For an analysis of the rising costs of patent 
litigation, see Christopher A. Harkins, Fending Off Paper Patents and Patent 
Trolls: A Novel “Cold Fusion” Defense Because Changing Times Demand It, 17 
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 407, 434–38 (2007) (discussing an AIPLA survey and 
arguing how costs of litigation are used by patent trolls asserting paper patents 
to extort a nuisance settlement, thereby resulting in social harm and crippling 
innovation; introducing a defense to combat paper patents and patent trolls, id. at 
453–77); see also View Eng’g, Inc. v. Robotic Vision Sys., Inc., 208 F.3d 981, 
986 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“A patent suit can be an expensive proposition.”).   
12 For simplicity, the term “plaintiff” refers to patent owners suing for patent 
infringement or defending against a declaratory judgment action based on their 
cease-and-desist letter.  The term “defendant” refers to a party accused of patent 
infringement and who is either being sued for patent infringement or is bringing 
a declaratory judgment action for non-infringement. 
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distinction between notice for purposes of proving simple infringement13 
and recovering actual damages on the one hand, compared to notice for 
purposes of proving willful infringement and recovering enhanced 
damages on the other.14  Generally stated, actual damages are decreased 
when notice fails to meet the requirements of the marking statute under 
Section 287(a),15 while enhanced damages are denied when, under the 
totality-of-circumstances test, the defendant did not have notice 
sufficient to trigger a duty to investigate and avoid willful infringement. 
¶11 In this section, Part A sets forth an overview of the totality of 
circumstances considered in assessing whether infringement was willful.  
Part B provides an analytical framework of the types of notice that courts 
recognized as invoking a defendant’s duty to avoid willfully infringing a 
patent.  Part C concludes this section with a discussion of the ways a 
plaintiff may prove notice in order to recover actual damages. 
A. Willful Infringement and the “Totality of Circumstances” 
¶12 While innocent parties may be liable for patent infringement,16 
willful infringement does not lie based on “the simple fact of 
infringement.”17  Instead, it requires culpability on the part of the 
                                                     
13 See infra note 16 and accompanying text (Strict liability for patent 
infringement does not depend on negligence or intent to harm, but is actionable 
simply based on the fact that an accused product or method infringes a patented 
invention).   
14 See supra notes 2–3 (Remedies for willful infringement are founded on § 284 
and § 285); see also Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana 
Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc).  
15 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006). 
16 In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) 
(“Because patent infringement is a strict liability offense, the nature of the 
offense is only relevant in determining whether enhanced damages are 
warranted.”); Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 
1527 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“[I]ntent is not an element of direct 
infringement, whether literal or by equivalents . . . Infringement is, and should 
remain, a strict liability offense.”).  
17 Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 363 F.3d 1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“There 
is no evidentiary presumption that every infringement is willful.”). 
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infringer.18  Therefore, a finding of actual infringement is necessary but 
not sufficient to satisfy willfulness, which is a question of fact.19 
1. A Brief Historical Perspective of Willfulness Prior 
to the Federal Circuit’s Seagate Technology 
Decision 
¶13 According to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 
its 2004 decision in Knorr-Bremse, the duty to avoid infringing a known 
patent is fundamental to determining willful infringement.20  Until 
recently, there was 24-year precedent, in Underwater Devices, Inc. v. 
Morrison-Knudsen Co.,21 for the proposition that, where “a potential 
infringer has actual notice of another’s patent rights, he has an 
affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine whether or not he is 
infringing.”22   
¶14 While Underwater Devices was cited as good law in the Federal 
Circuit’s Knorr-Bremse23 decision in 2004, and even EchoStar24 in 2006, 
the Federal Circuit’s 2007 decision, In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 
overruled the duty of “due care” as too akin to a negligence-like state of 
mind as shown in the next subpart.25  However, the Federal Circuit in 
                                                     
18 Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1342; see also Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1385 
(Newman, J., concurring) (“The fundamental issue remains the reasonableness, 
or in turn the culpability, of commercial behavior that violates legally protected 
property rights.”). 
19 Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
2006).  
20 Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1345 (“[T]here continues to be ‘an affirmative 
duty of due care to avoid infringement of the known patent rights of others.’”) 
(citation omitted). 
21 Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389 
(Fed. Cir. 1983). 
22 Id.   
23 Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1343.   
24 In re EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see 
also id. at 1302 n.4 (“noting that an infringer may continue its infringement after 
notification of the patent by filing suit and that the infringer has a duty of due 
care to avoid infringement after such notification”) (citing Crystal 
Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int’l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 
1351–53 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).  
25 Christopher A. Harkins, Choosing Between the Advice of Counsel Defense to 
Willful Patent Infringement or the Effective Assistance of Trial Counsel: A 
Bridge or the Troubled Waters?, 5 NORTHWESTERN J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 
210, 229–33 (2007) (arguing that Underwater Devices and EchoStar have set off 
a veritable feeding frenzy against defendants who rely on the opinion of counsel 
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Seagate Technology reaffirmed26 “willfulness” as the standard for 
enhanced damages to be evaluated under the “totality of circumstances” 
discussed below. 
¶15 At trial, there must be a finding of actual infringement, and then 
a separate determination by the fact finder of whether the defendant’s 
infringement was willful.27  In reaching its decision, the fact finder 
considers the “totality of circumstances,”28 which include the following 
factors: 
(1) whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design of 
another;  (2) whether the infringer, when he knew of the other’s 
patent protection, investigated the scope of the patent and formed a 
good-faith belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed; (3) 
the infringer’s behavior as a party to the litigation; (4) defendant’s 
size and financial condition; (5) closeness of the case; (6) duration 
of defendant’s misconduct; (7) remedial action by the defendant; (8) 
defendant’s motivation for harm; and (9) whether defendant 
attempted to conceal its misconduct.29
                                                                                                                       
defense, whereby some courts are putting defendants to a Hobson’s choice of 
asserting that defense in order to stave off enhanced damages on the one hand, 
and waiving all privileged communications—even with trial counsel itself—on 
the other), cited in H.R. Rep. No. 110-314, at 28 nn.15 & 18 (Sept. 4, 2007) 
(The “Patent Reform Act of 2007” is pending in the Senate for consideration 
and is available at http://www.rules.house.gov/110/text/110_hr1908rpt.pdf (last 
visited October 4, 2007)). 
26 In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) 
(“This well-established standard accords with Supreme Court precedent.”); see 
also id. at 1369 (“Over time, our cases evolved to evaluate willfulness . . . under 
the totality of circumstances.”); id. at 1377 (Gajarsa, J., concurring) (“[T]his 
court has nevertheless read a willfulness standard into the statute.”).  Judge 
Gajarsa wrote separately in a concurring opinion to restore the flexibility of the 
remedial nature of 35 U.S.C. § 284 such that “a discretionary enhancement of 
damages would be appropriate for entirely remedial reasons, irrespective of the 
defendant’s state of mind.”  Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1378 (Gajarsa, J., 
concurring). 
27 Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., 449 F.3d 1209, 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(“The drawing of inferences, particularly in respect of an intent-implicating 
question such as willfulness, is peculiarly within the province of the fact finder 
that observed the witnesses.”) (citation omitted). 
28 Liquid Dynamics., 449 F.3d at 1225; see also Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz 
Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. 
Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1998).   
29 Liquid Dynamics, 449 F.3d at 1225 (citation, ellipsis, and internal quotation 
marks omitted).   
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¶16 The plaintiff must prove willfulness by clear and convincing 
evidence.30  Once the plaintiff meets its burden of persuasion and burden 
of production as to willfulness,31 the burden of production shifts to the 
defendant to introduce evidence to rebut plaintiff’s showing that the 
defendant acted with objective recklessness.32  An express finding of 
willfulness is necessary before the second step.33 
¶17 Second, the court exercises its discretion in determining whether 
to increase the damage award based on the fact finder’s determination of 
willfulness.34  An “express finding of willful infringement”35 merely 
authorizes—it does not mandate—treble damages and attorneys’ fees.36  
The paramount factor in deciding to grant enhanced damages, and the 
amount of those damages, is the defendant’s culpable conduct or bad 
faith.  In assessing the state of mind of a defendant who the fact finder 
decides to have infringed a patent willfully, courts consider many factors 
in addition to the totality of the circumstances listed above.37  These 
                                                     
30 Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1371 (“Accordingly, to establish willful 
infringement, a patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence” objective 
recklessness); nCube Corp. v. Seachange Int’l, Inc., 436 F.3d 1317, 1319 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006) (“A jury verdict of willfulness requires a finding ‘by clear and 
convincing evidence in view of the totality of the circumstances that [the 
defendant] acted in disregard of the . . . patent and lacked a reasonable basis for 
believing it had a right to do what it did.’”) (quoting Amsted Indus., Inc. v. 
Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 181 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 
31 Comark Commc’ns, 156 F.3d at 1190.  
32 Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 363 F.3d 1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(“[A]bsent an initial presentation of evidence . . . this burden of coming forward 
in defense [does] not arise.”). 
33 Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 407 F.3d 1297, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 
2005).  An express finding of willful infringement is necessary before the court 
awards enhanced damages.  Id.   
34 In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) 
(“Trial courts have had statutory discretion to enhance damages for patent 
infringement since 1836.”); Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 
F.3d 1354, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Any trebling of damages based on a finding 
of willfulness is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”). 
35 Group One, 407 F.3d at 1308–09 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (When the court exercises 
its discretion in denying willfulness damages, it must explain why.) (citation 
omitted). 
36 Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1368 (“But, a finding of willfulness does not 
require an award of enhanced damages; it merely permits it.”); Group One, 407 
F.3d at 1309 (On a jury finding of willful patent infringement, a “court may 
award attorney fees and not enhanced damages, or vice versa.”). 
37 See supra Part I.A.1 and notes 28–29 (identifying the factors that comprise the 
“totality of circumstances”); see also Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., 
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additional factors include evidence of whether the defendant took (or 
failed to take) reasonable steps to design around the patent to avoid 
infringement,38 evidence of whether (and to what extent) the defendant 
simply copied the patented invention,39 and evidence offered by the 
defendant that it obtained and relied on the advice of counsel when the 
defendant decided to continue sales of the accused product.40 
¶18 In short, when the defendant knows of the patent and fails to 
carry out its duty to avoid infringing a valid and enforceable patent, a 
court may find willful infringement provided the defendant was more 
than merely negligent.  As a result, the plaintiff may be entitled to treble 
damages as well as attorneys’ fees,41 and such an award in patent 
litigation can be “punitive.”42 
2. Seagate Technology Permits a Finding of 
Willfulness Based on a Showing of “Objective 
Recklessness” 
¶19 The Federal Circuit, in its en banc decision in In re Seagate 
Technology, LLC,43 addressed the issue of whether, given the “impact” 
                                                                                                                       
449 F.3d 1209, 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“A finding of willful infringement is 
made after considering the totality of the circumstances.”). 
38  Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1371 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (stating that failure to attempt to design around the patent may 
justify enhanced damages).   
39 Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics Inc., 96 F.3d 1409, 1414 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (holding no need to find “slavish copying” if copying was made 
“deliberately”); Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996); 
Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992).     
40 Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (finding that 
a court may consider evidence that the defendant obtained an opinion of counsel 
of whether the accused product infringes any valid, enforceable claim of the 
patent.); but see In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(en banc) (“Because we abandon the affirmative duty of due care, we also 
reemphasize that there is no affirmative obligation to obtain opinion of 
counsel.”). 
41 See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006) (“The court in exceptional cases may award 
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”).  
42 Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1370 (characterizing enhanced damages as 
“punitive damages”); see also Glenayre Elecs., Inc. v. Jackson, 443 F.3d 851, 
869 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (characterizing as possibly “punitive” the increased 
damages under the statute’s trebling provision in a case of willful infringement); 
Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 
1337, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc).  
43 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).  
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of Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.,44 the Court 
should reconsider that decision and the “duty of care standard itself.”45  
The Federal Circuit overruled the standard of “due care” set forth in 
Underwater Devices and adopted an “objective recklessness” standard.46 
¶20 One cannot deny that the Federal Circuit’s recent decision in 
Seagate Technology raised the bar on the standard of proof necessary to 
establish willful infringement.  While “due care” appeared simple 
enough, it could lead to a misapplication of the willfulness standard.  If 
misapplied, a defendant could be found liable for enhanced damages by 
merely failing to act with “reasonable care,”47 which lowered the 
willfulness standard to one more akin to negligence.  According to the 
court, the reasonable care “standard fails to comport with the general 
understanding of willfulness in the civil context, and it allows punitive 
damages in a manner inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.”48 
¶21 The Federal Circuit in Seagate Technology took a common-sense 
approach by ridding patent jurisprudence of law allowing enhanced 
damages under the “due care” standard specifically, but without 
discarding all other well-developed law on willfulness and the totality of 
circumstances in general.  It follows that, at its core, Seagate Technology 
was not taking patent jurisprudence back to the days “when widespread 
disregard of patent rights was undermining the national innovation 
incentive”49 and no license was given to a defendant’s “bad faith” 
infringement.50 
¶22 So, the Federal Circuit replaced the lower “due care” threshold 
required for proving willful infringement with a higher threshold that 
required at least a showing of “objective recklessness.”51  The new 
standard has both an objective aspect and a quasi-subjective one: 
Accordingly, to establish willful infringement, a patentee must 
show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted 
despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted 
                                                     
44 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
45 Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1397. 
46 Id. at 1371. 
47 Id. at 1385 (Newman, J., concurring). 
48 Id. at 1371 (citation omitted). 
49 Id. at 1369 (citing Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana 
Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc)).  
50 Id. at 1368; see also id. at 1385 (Newman, J., concurring) (“It cannot be the 
court’s intention to tolerate the intentional disregard or destruction of the value 
of the property of another, simply because that property is a patent.”).  
51 Id. at 1371 (“[W]e abandon the affirmative duty of due care . . . .”).   
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infringement of a valid patent.  The state of mind of the accused 
infringer is not relevant to this objective inquiry.  If this threshold 
objective standard is satisfied, the patentee must also demonstrate 
that this objectively-defined risk (determined by the record 
developed in the infringement proceeding) was either known or so 
obvious that it should have been known to the accused infringer.52
¶23 The Federal Circuit chose not to spell out precisely the meaning 
of the new standard under the two-prong test quoted above.53  Rather, the 
Federal Circuit “left it to future cases to further develop.”54 
¶24 Hence, trial courts remain free to exercise their discretion and to 
consider unique circumstances showing, by clear and convincing 
evidence, a high likelihood that a defendant’s acts—or omissions—were 
objectively unreasonable and, in turn, subjectively or at least objectively 
culpable.  It is on this theory that, when a defendant plays ostrich, it may 
be held to have acted with objective recklessness:  To know, and to want 
not to know because one suspects infringement, may be, if not the same 
state of mind, the same degree of fault. 
B. “Notice” that Triggers a Defendant’s Duty to Avoid Willful 
Infringement 
¶25 When a company becomes aware of a patent that may be 
relevant to its products and should realize there is a high likelihood of 
infringement, it has an affirmative duty to avoid infringement.55  In 
practical application, a test of when this duty arises depends on the 
particular facts and circumstances surrounding the position of the person 
                                                     
52 Id. at 1371 (citation omitted).  In his concurring opinion, Judge Gajarsa reads 
the court’s test as requiring “clear and convincing evidence, (1) that 
[defendant’s] theory of noninfringement/invalidity, was not only incorrect, but 
was objectively unreasonable, and (2) that [defendant] ran a risk of infringing 
[plaintiff’s] patents substantially greater than the risk associated with a theory of 
noninfringement/invalidity that was merely careless.”  Id. at 1384. 
53 Id. at 1371 (“We fully recognize that ‘the term [reckless] is not self-
defining.’” (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994))). 
54 Id. at 1371; see also id. at 1385 (Newman, J., concurring) (“Although new 
uncertainties are introduced by the court’s evocation of ‘objected standards’ for 
such inherently subjective criteria as ‘recklessness’ and ‘reasonableness,’ I trust 
that judicial wisdom will come to show the way, in the common-law tradition.”). 
55 Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
2006) (citation omitted).  Accordingly, the evenhanded recklessness standard 
modified the “duty” by making clear that objective standards of conduct do not 
require “that every possibly related patent must be exhaustively studied by 
expensive legal talent.”  In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1385 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007) (en banc) (Newman, J., concurring).  
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who received notice of the patent, how that person received notice of the 
patent, a record showing objectively reckless disregard of such notice, 
and the mindset of the person when he or she received the notice and 
chose to act or not act. 
¶26 This duty arises when the defendant received “actual notice of 
another’s patent,”56 coupled with objective evidence that infringement 
was highly likely and the defendant knew or should have recognized the 
infringement risks.57  At that moment, there arises an affirmative duty to 
investigate whether any claim of the patent is being infringed.  Notice of 
the patent may come in the form of a complaint alleging patent 
infringement,58 in the form of a cease-and-desist letter,59 or in a letter 
offering to license the patent.60 
¶27 However, at least one court held that notice occurred when in-
house counsel merely saw a patent that was referenced in the Official 
                                                     
56 See supra Part I.A.1; see also nCube Corp. v. Seachange Int’l, Inc., 436 F.3d 
1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
57 This “duty to avoid infringement” as used herein is consistent with the Federal 
Circuit decision in Seagate Technology.  The Federal Circuit could not possibly 
have meant, in adopting the “objective recklessness” test, “to ratify intentional 
disregard, and to reject objective standards requiring a reasonable respect for 
property rights.”  Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1385 (Newman, J., concurring).  To 
vitiate any duty to avoid infringement—when there is objective evidence of 
reckless disregard for the risks of infringement—would unwittingly encourage 
an unscrupulous defendant, in ostrich-like fashion, to seek cover in the sand so 
as to disavow any specific knowledge of infringement. 
58 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006) (“Filing of an action for infringement 
shall constitute such notice.”); State Indus. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 
1235–36 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (reversing the finding of willful infringement where 
the complaint was filed just twenty-two days after the asserted patent had issued 
and there was no clear evidence that the defendant copied the patented 
invention).   
59 Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 355 F.3d 1327, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(affirming the district court’s finding that infringement was willful based on 
Wal-Mart’s failure to take appropriate action after receiving the patent owner’s 
cease-and-desist letter—even if most sales were made prior to receiving the 
letter, there was evidence that Wal-Mart continued to sell off its remaining 
inventory after it learned of its possible infringement). 
60 Evidence supported a determination that infringement was willful when the 
infringer had actual notice of plaintiff’s patent rights before the infringement 
began, when the notice was by letter offering a license under the patent before 
any infringement took place, and defendant chose to proceed without a license.  
Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1384 (Fed. 
Cir. 1983), rev’d in part on other grounds, Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer 
Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc).  
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Gazette of the United States Patent and Trademark Office.61  While the 
defendant argued that it had not recognized the alleged infringement 
risks posed by its product, the Federal Circuit gave weight to the fact that 
in-house counsel associated the patent with the accused product in their 
capacity as counsel for the potential infringer.62 
¶28 Another court found a potential infringer to be on notice when 
the asserted patent was cited by the potential infringer in an information 
disclosure statement,63 even though the patent application had no direct 
relationship with the allegedly infringing product.64  According to the 
defendant, in order to trigger the alleged infringer’s duty to avoid 
infringement “in the face of knowledge about the patent, the patent 
owner must show that the accused infringer both knew about the patent 
and understood that the patent raised a potential infringement 
problem.”65 The court found the defendant’s argument “that actual notice 
requires both knowledge of the patent and knowledge of the potential for 
infringement to be unpersuasive.”66 
¶29 These cases seem to be converting the notice standard from a 
question asking what the potential infringer “had known” into a question 
asking what the defendant “should have known.”  As district courts 
struggle over the appropriate question to ask in applying the notice 
standard for purposes of willful infringement—once the “threshold 
objective standard is satisfied,”67 the Federal Circuit has simply said that 
there must be something more than mere “constructive notice”68 to 
trigger the duty to avoid infringement and evidence that the objectively-
                                                     
61 Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics Inc., 96 F.3d 1409, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 
1997). 
62 Id. at 1415–16.   
63 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.97, 1.98 (2006). 
64 Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 
1037 (D. Del. 2001), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 370 F.3d 
1131 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
65 Id. at 1037. 
66 Id. (finding that notice was sufficient to send the issue to the jury, because 
there was a memorandum in the defendant’s files making reference to the patent 
citing it to the PTO in an application that in-house counsel was prosecuting). 
67 In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).  
68 Imonex Services, Inc., v. Munzprufer Dietmar Trenner GMBH, 408 F.3d 
1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Constructive notice, as by marking a product with 
a patent number, is insufficient to trigger this duty.”). 
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defined risk was “known or so obvious that it should have been 
known.”69 
¶30 Indeed, the Federal Circuit held that a potential infringer’s duty 
may be triggered by notice received by any corporate employee, 
including engineers.70  In other words, a defendant who intentionally 
blinds itself to the facts and law, and then continues to infringe, may be 
found to be a willful infringer by imputing71 the state of mind of 
employees to the state of mind of the defendant.72 
¶31 Therefore, one potential consequence of a defendant who has 
notice of the patent, but who ignores an objectively high risk of 
infringement, is being held liable for treble damages.73  The trebling is of 
all actual damages, which is addressed next. 
C. “Notice” that Triggers a Plaintiff’s Actual Damages 
¶32 By statute, a plaintiff may only recover actual damages accruing 
after the date it placed the alleged infringer on notice of infringement.74  
                                                     
69 Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1371.   
70 SRI Int’l v. Advanced Tech. Labs., 127 F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(finding actual notice when defendant’s “engineers [had] expressed their 
concerns” about the patent in a memorandum).   
71 “Under the general common law of agency, ‘[e]xcept where the agent is 
acting adversely to the principal . . . the principal is affected by the knowledge 
which an agent has a duty to disclose to the principal . . . to the same extent as if 
the principal had the information.’”  Long Island Sav. Bank v. U.S., 476 F.3d 
917, 929 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 275 (1958) 
and the copyright case Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 
730, 751–52 (1989) (relying on the Restatement in determining whether the 
hired party was an employee or independent contractor for Copyright Act 
purposes)).  For a discussion of Reid, see Christopher A. Harkins, Tattoos and 
Copyright Infringement: Celebrities, Marketers, and Businesses Beware of the 
Ink, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 313, 324–26 (2006). 
72 Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
73 Another potential consequence is attorneys’ fees, which are based on detailed 
attorney timesheets, detailed billing statements and invoices showing actual 
charges billed to the client in connection with the representation, evidence that 
expenses were both reasonable and necessary in the normal course of attorney 
services, evidence of the customary attorney rates in the relevant legal 
community for handling patent litigation, and any premium in attorneys’ rates 
based on skill and experience.  Junker v. Eddings, 396 F.3d 1359, 1365–66 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005).   
74 35 U.S.C. § 287(a)–(b) (2006); see also Am. Med. Sys. v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 
6 F.3d 1523, 1537 n.18 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Section 287(a) requires a party 
asserting infringement to either provide constructive notice (through marking) or 
actual notice to avail itself of damages.  The notice of infringement must 
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Here, the notice for purposes of willfulness and the notice for actual 
damages deviate. 
¶33 While willfulness focuses on the time when the potential 
infringer possessed knowledge of the patent and facts sufficient to 
establish an objectively high likelihood of infringement, the notice 
requirement for actual damages under § 287(a) focuses on the conduct of 
the plaintiff and asks the questions of when the plaintiff gave the 
defendant notice of the patent and accused the defendant of patent 
infringement.75  Consequently, for actual damages to accrue, mere 
“notice of the patent’s existence or ownership” is not “notice of 
infringement” and is not an “affirmative communication [to the potential 
infringer] of a specific charge of infringement by a specific accused 
product or device.”76 
¶34 In contrast to willfulness, the plaintiff may meet its burden of 
proving notice under § 287(a) by giving the potential defendant 
“constructive” notice,77 such as when the plaintiff and its licensees mark 
products with patent numbers that cover those products.78  Moreover, the 
                                                                                                                       
therefore come from the patentee, not the infringer.”); Amsted Indus. Inc. v. 
Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 187 (Fed. Cir.1994) (“For purposes of 
section 287(a), notice must be of ‘the infringement,’ not merely notice of the 
patent’s existence or ownership.”). 
75 Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing SRI 
Int’l v. Advanced Tech. Labs., 127 F.3d 1462, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); see also 
Amsted Indus., 24 F.3d at 187 (“The correct approach to determining notice 
under section 287 must focus on the action of the patentee, not the knowledge of 
the infringer.”). 
76 Amsted Indus., 24 F.3d at 187.   
77 Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Delta Cotton Coop. Inc., 457 F.3d 1269, 1276 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006) (recovering damages for patent infringement requires a plaintiff to 
prove “either actual or constructive notice” to the defendant of plaintiff’s 
patent); Sentry Protection Prods., Inc. v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 400 F.3d 910, 918 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Constructive notice is provided when the patentee 
consistently marks substantially all of its patented products.”) (internal citation 
and brackets omitted); Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1111 (Fed. Cir. 
1996) (A plaintiff “is entitled to damages from the time when it either began 
marking its product in compliance with section 287(a), constructive notice, or 
when it actually notified the accused infringer of its infringement, whichever 
was earlier.”) (internal citation and brackets omitted).  
78 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006) (“Patentees, and persons making, offering for sale, 
or selling within the United States any patented article for or under them or 
importing any patented article into the United States, may give notice to the 
public that the same is patented, either by fixing thereon the word ‘patent’ or the 
abbreviation ‘pat.’, together with the number of the patent, or when, from the 
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Federal Circuit held that, to rely on the constructive-notice provisions of 
§ 287(a), full compliance with that section requires the patentee to 
“consistently mark[] substantially all of its patented products.”79 
¶35 Absent marking, the plaintiff cannot prove constructive notice or 
recover actual damages for any period of time prior to the date when the 
defendant received actual notice of the patent.  In that case, actual 
damages may be recovered, if at all, only from the date on which actual 
notice was given by the plaintiff80 to the defendant.  Actual notice may 
come in the form of the plaintiff filing a lawsuit or sending a letter to the 
defendant accusing it of infringing the plaintiff’s patent.81 
¶36 Therefore, in some respects, willfulness has a more lenient 
“notice” requirement than the notice requirement under § 287(a).  As a 
result, the willfulness clock may start to run long before the plaintiff ever 
informs the defendant, by letter or complaint for patent infringement, that 
the accused product infringes the asserted patent.  The upshot of an early 
date for willfulness is to put the defendant at risk that all damages will be 
trebled and that a defendant may owe attorneys’ fees from the onset of 
the litigation forward. 
¶37 To further place the “notice” standard for willfulness in context, 
it should be noted that the actual notice required under § 287(a) is even 
lower than the standard necessary to support declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction.82  Moreover, the Federal Circuit recently lowered the 
requirements necessary to establish an actual controversy under the 
Declaratory Judgment Act for patent cases in general,83 and for a patent-
related declaratory judgment action under the Hatch-Waxman Act and 
                                                                                                                       
character of the article, this cannot be done, by fixing to it, or to the package 
wherein on or more of them is contained, a label containing a like notice.”). 
79 Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
80 Lans v. Digital Equip. Corp., 252 F.3d 1320, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[N]otice 
from someone closely associated with the patentee does not satisfy § 287(a).”). 
81 SRI Int’l v. Advanced Tech. Labs., 127 F.3d 1462, 1469–70 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(Actual notice may be achieved “when the recipient is informed of the identity 
of the patent.”).  
82 Id. at 1470 (“Actual notice may be achieved without creating a case of actual 
controversy in terms of 28 U.S.C. § 2201.”).   
83 SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1380–81 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007).  
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the Orange Book in particular.84  However, at least one Federal Circuit 
judge has hinted that the new declaratory judgment standard is too low.85 
II. CAN THE “ORANGE BOOK” SATISFY THE “NOTICE 
REQUIREMENT” FOR WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT? 
¶38 In a case of first impression, the Southern District of New York 
in Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc.86 decided online 
pharmacies were entitled to summary judgment on the grounds that the 
Orange Book did not constitute statutory notice of patent infringement 
under § 287(a).87  Because the patent owner did not mark its product 
with the patent number and the patent already expired at the time the 
lawsuit was filed, the patent owner could not recover pre-filing 
damages88 without the Orange Book theory of notice.  After the court’s 
summary judgment order limiting the damages available to plaintiff to 
the filing date of the complaint, and presumably directly resulting from 
that order, the case was soon dismissed pending settlement.89 
¶39 Significantly, it was not argued in Merck, and thereby left for 
another day, another court and other litigants, whether the Orange Book 
might constitute notice sufficient to trigger willful infringement if 
coupled with at least a showing of objective recklessness.  The question 
is especially intriguing given a pharmaceutical company’s “obligation”90 
to consult the Orange Book before selling or offering for sale medication 
regulated by the FDA.  This Section summarizes relevant aspects of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act and makes some observations about the Merck 
decision and this novel theory of willfulness. 
                                                     
84 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Novartix Pharms. Corp., 480 F.3d 1372, 1380–81 
(Fed. Cir. 2007).   
85 SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1384 (Bryson, J., concurring) (“[V]irtually any invitation 
to take a paid license relating to the prospective licensee’s activities would give 
rise to an Article III case or controversy if the prospective licensee elects to 
assert that its conduct does not fall within the scope of the patent.”). 
86 434 F. Supp. 2d 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
87 Id. at 265. 
88 Id. at 264. 
89 On February 21, 2007, one month after the trial court’s ruling that the patent 
owner could not recover pre-filing damages, the court entered an order granting 
the parties’ stipulated dismissal with prejudice.   
90 Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 376 F.3d 1339, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[A] 
generic company has an obligation to consult the Orange Book.”).  
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A. An Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
¶40 The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act,91 
commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act,92 allows for FDA approval 
of generic drugs according to a statutory procedure that is much faster 
and less expensive than the FDA-approval process the original innovator 
of the drug followed before introducing its patented medication or 
method to the consumer market.  The Hatch-Waxman Act attempts to 
balance the interests of generic-drug manufacturers and the innovator 
companies whose pioneering drugs are subject to patent protection.93  To 
a large extent, the Hatch-Waxman Act succeeded in striking the difficult 
balance between inducing “name-brand pharmaceutical firms to make 
the investments necessary to research and develop new drug products, 
while simultaneously enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic 
copies of those drugs to the market.”94 
¶41 Thus, the Hatch-Waxman Act gave something to both generic 
companies and brand-name companies.  Streamlined guidelines 
simplified the FDA-approval process for generic drugs, while lower 
jurisdictional requirements allowed a patent owner to bring a declaratory 
judgment action for a declaration of infringement and validity of its 
patents, as shown below.  Offsetting the generic company’s relatively 
speedier process through the FDA, the research-based drug company (a 
“pioneer” or “innovator”) is compensated for the protracted FDA-
                                                     
91 Congress passed the Act as an amendment to the Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355).   
92 Joel Graham, The Legality of Hatch Waxman Pharmaceutical Settlements: Is 
the Terazosin Test the Proper Prescription?, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 429, 429 n.2 
(2006) (“This Act is typically referred to as the Hatch-Waxman Act because of 
the congressional sponsors, Senator Orrin Hatch and Representative Henry 
Waxman.”) (citation omitted). 
93 See Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations; Patent Exclusivity 
Provisions, 59 Fed. Reg. 50338 (Oct. 3, 1994) (“Congress intended these 
provisions to provide a careful balance between promoting competition among 
brand-name and duplicate or ‘generic’ drugs and encouraging research and 
innovation.”). 
94 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 192 
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) (citation omitted); see also Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, 
Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Congress struck a balance between 
two competing policy interests: (1) inducing pioneering research and 
development of new drugs and (2) enabling competitors to bring low-cost, 
generic copies of those drugs to market.”). 
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approval process by a patent-term extension of up to five years of patent 
exclusivity.95 
¶42 Owing to the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic companies may begin 
developing their drugs notwithstanding the drug innovator’s patent 
protection.96  Before the Hatch-Waxman Act became law, these same 
activities amounted to patent infringement because they constituted a 
“use” of the patented composition or method.97 
¶43 By allowing generic companies to use the patented invention to 
develop a generic alternative to the patented drug, these generic 
companies gained advantages to entry into the marketplace in at least 
two respects.  First, generic companies may offer their generic drugs as 
soon as the patent expires98 because they would be allowed to use the 
patented drug or method during the patent term to develop their own 
generic counterpart.  Second, the generic companies may challenge the 
validity of the patent, or otherwise compete during the patent term, by 
seeking FDA approval to market non-infringing alternatives via 
procedural mechanisms.99  Both benefits stem from the companies’ 
qualified use of a patent owner’s claimed invention. 
¶44 Turning now to relevant procedure under the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, the generic-drug companies are relieved from submitting the 
extensive drug safety and efficacy data necessary for FDA approval.  
Instead of the rigorous process required of a pioneer-drug innovator in its 
New Drug Application (“NDA”), the generic-drug company only needs 
to file an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) that merely 
relies on the drug innovator’s NDA data, without authorization, 
permission, or payment to the drug innovator for the use of its data.100  
Under this procedure, generic-drug applicants avoid the tremendous time 
and capital outlay to obtain the safety and efficacy data necessary for 
                                                     
95 Ashlee B. Mehl, The Hatch-Waxman Act and Market Exclusivity for Generic 
Drug Manufacturers: An Entitlement or an Incentive?, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
649, 653 (2006); see also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 670 
(1990); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th 
Cir. 2003).  
96 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006).  
97 Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(“It is well-established, in particular, that the use of a patented invention, 
without either manufacture or sale, is actionable.”) (emphasis in original). 
98 See Mehl, supra note 95, at 650 (“This allows the generic firm to market its 
product immediately, driving down drug prices for consumers earlier than 
otherwise would have been possible.”).  
99 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).   
100 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A).   
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FDA approval.  As a result, the ANDA procedure allows the generic-
drug applicant to move swiftly through the FDA-approval process either 
by not challenging the patent issued to the drug innovator or, 
alternatively, by challenging the patent on grounds the patent is either 
invalid or would not be infringed, commonly referred to as a Paragraph 
IV certification.101 
¶45 If the generic-drug manufacturer files a Paragraph IV 
certification asserting that the patent is invalid or not infringed, the 
ANDA applicant must notify the patent owner.102  Although the generic 
drug is not yet on the market at this time (indeed, it still needs FDA 
approval), the filing of a Paragraph IV certification constitutes an act of 
infringement upon which the patent owner has forty-five days103 to file a 
federal lawsuit to adjudicate whether the generic-drug manufacturer 
infringes any valid patent claim.104  If the patent owner elects to sue, then 
there is an automatic thirty-month stay of the FDA’s examination of the 
generic-drug company’s ANDA while the patent litigation proceeds.105 
¶46 The Orange Book was born out of the ANDA process of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act.  Officially entitled the “Approved Drug Products 
with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations,” the Orange Book identifies 
(1) drug products approved by the FDA, (2) therapeutic equivalence 
evaluations for multi-source prescription-drug products, and (3) patent 
information concerning the listed drugs.  To further the ANDA statutory 
scheme, the innovator-drug company seeking FDA approval must file 
information concerning each of its patents claiming a drug or a method 
of using a drug subject to the patent owner’s NDA.106 
¶47 Under the mandate of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the Orange Book 
is published by the FDA in furtherance of the ANDA process for the 
generic-drug company to review before seeking approval to manufacture, 
use, sell, or offer for sale FDA-approved drugs protected by the NDA’s 
                                                     
101 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).   
102 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B). 
103 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
104 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2); Organon, Inc. v. Teva Pharm., Inc., 244 F. Supp. 
2d 370, 374 (D.N.J. 2002) (“In order to allow courts to determine in advance 
whether the sale of a generic will infringe the patent listed in the Orange Book, 
§ 271(e)(2) makes the filing of a paragraph IV certification automatically ‘an act 
of infringement.’  This allows courts to peer into the future at the likelihood of 
infringement once the generic is on the market, without a ripeness deficiency.”). 
105 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
106 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1); 21 C.F.R. § 314.53. 
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patent protection.107  Moreover, the information submitted by the NDA 
(providing notice of the patent and covered products) is included in the 
Orange Book where ANDA applicants should look—indeed, must 
look—when seeking FDA approval for generic copies of FDA-approved 
drugs. 
¶48 In this context, the Federal Circuit has recognized that, in at least 
two respects, the listings in the Orange Book serve the competing 
interests of generic and brand-name manufacturers as Congress intended 
when implementing the Hatch-Waxman Act.  First, the Orange Book 
provides “a streamlined mechanism for identifying and resolving patent 
issues related to the proposed generic products.”108  Second, the Orange 
Book facilitates “judicial resolution of the question whether the generic 
drug would infringe a pertinent patent.”109 
B. A Novel Theory of Notice via the Orange Book 
¶49 Can the patent listings in the Orange Book satisfy the notice 
requirement under § 287(a)?110  Can the Orange Book serve as notice to 
the accused infringer for purposes of willfulness?111 
¶50 Until recently, no reported decision addressed the issue of 
whether a plaintiff can point to the Orange Book to satisfy § 287(a) 
notice.  Moreover, there is still no reported decision on the issue of 
whether a defendant who reviews the Orange Book before engaging in 
commercial activity—or deliberately fails to determine the extent of its 
obligations under the Orange Book—is on notice of infringement 
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the “objectively reckless” 
standard of willfulness.  The Federal Circuit has not addressed either 
scenario. 
                                                     
107 See Food and Drug Administration Center for Drug Evaluation and Research 
Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, Preface to 
Twenty Seventh Edition at v, http://www.fda.gov/cder/orange/obannual.pdf  
(last visited October 4, 2007) (“The 1984 Amendments required the Agency to 
begin publishing an up-to-date list of all marketed drug products, OTC as well 
as prescription, that have been approved for safety and efficacy and for which 
new drug applications are required.”).  The Electronic Orange Book is available 
at http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/default.htm (last visited October 4, 2007).   
108 Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
109 Id.   
110 See supra Part I.C (discussing the type of notice required to give rise to 
actual infringement damages).   
111 See supra Part I.B (discussing the type of notice required to give rise to a 
defendant’s duty to avoid willful infringement).   
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1. Does the Orange Book Provide Notice Under 
§ 287(a)? 
¶51 The first decision to address § 287(a) and the Orange Book is 
Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc. from the Southern 
District of New York.112  Canadian defendants operated online 
pharmacies offering generic versions of the plaintiffs’ popular 
cholesterol-lowering medication Zocor®.  The plaintiffs did not mark 
their Zocor® pills with any indication of the patents protecting the 
composition and methods of making the active ingredient.  In 
compliance with the Hatch-Waxman Act, however, the plaintiffs listed 
the patent in the FDA’s Orange Book.  The defendants filed a motion for 
summary judgment asserting that, because Merck failed to mark its own 
Zocor® pills and failed to give actual notice of patent infringement, 
Merck should be prohibited from recovering any damages accrued before 
filing the patent infringement complaint. 
¶52 Initially, the district court addressed the issue of whether 
marking is required for patents with both method claims and apparatus 
claims.  The court noted the split of authority in a combined method and 
product patent.  According to the plaintiffs in Merck, the marking statute 
only applies where a tangible item exists for marking and the patent 
owner asserts both the product and method claims of the same patent.  In 
other words, the plaintiffs in Merck argued they could elect to assert only 
the method of use claim for the patent in suit, in which case Federal 
Circuit precedent did not require marking because there would be 
nothing physical to mark in a “process” or “method” claim. 
¶53 In distinguishing the ruling in the Federal Circuit decision in 
Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc. that “the notice requirement . . . 
does not apply where the patent is directed to a process,”113 the district 
court found the Hanson rule to be a narrow holding limited to the 
liability phase and not damages.114  The plaintiffs also relied on the 
Federal Circuit’s decision in American Medical Systems, Inc. v. Medical 
Engineering Corp.115 requiring marking only where “both apparatus and 
method claims of the . . . patent were asserted.”116  The district court 
disagreed with the conclusion of other courts interpreting American 
Medical Systems to excuse marking where only the method claims were 
                                                     
112 434 F. Supp. 2d 257 (2006). 
113 718 F.2d 1075, 1083 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
114 Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 257, 262 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).  
115 6 F.3d 1523 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
116 Id. at 1538–39.  
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asserted, and instead found that the marking statute must be followed 
when a tangible article is “capable” of being marked, even when a 
plaintiff elects to assert only the method claims of a mixed composition-
method patent.117 
¶54 Having found the patent-marking statute applied to the patents in 
suit, the district court acknowledged the issue of whether the Orange 
Book satisfied the marking statute as “one of first impression.”118  The 
district court found the Orange Book not to be the type of “affirmative 
communication of a specific charge of infringement by a specified 
accused product”119 as the district court interpreted Federal Circuit 
precedent.120 
¶55 But the Merck decision is only persuasive precedent, because the 
Federal Circuit has not decided the issue of whether (and to what extent) 
a plaintiff may rely on the Orange Book to satisfy the marking statute.  
Furthermore, there was no evidence that the defendants in Merck had 
notice of the patent from the Orange Book listing, because the defendants 
did not file an ANDA or a Paragraph IV certification. 
2. Does the Orange Book Provide Notice for Proving 
Willfulness? 
¶56 The explosion of ANDA suits signals an intensified struggle 
over the high-stakes prize of market exclusivity in the brand-name versus 
generic drug war.  When one additional month of exclusivity can 
significantly impact a company’s revenue stream, as it sometimes can, 
then the need to optimize the term of exclusivity will transform the rules 
of engagement under Hatch-Waxman and patent litigation.  Indeed, drug 
innovators face escalating competition from Canadian manufacturers of 
generic drugs, online drug companies, and retail giants such as Wal-
Mart® Super Centers filling prescriptions for four dollars with generic 
drugs.  With so many competitors turning a piece of the generic 
prescription drug business, drug innovators must turn to their patent 
counsel in hopes of boosting patent damages to make up for any shortfall 
in customer traffic and sales of their drugs. 
¶57 More precisely, the need for attorneys representing owners of 
pharmaceutical patents to innovate and quickly respond to client 
demands is greater than ever.  With brand-name clients becoming 
                                                     
117 Merck, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 262–63. 
118 Id. at 264. 
119 Id. at 263 (emphasis in original) (citing Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel 
Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 187 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).   
120 In addition to the Amsted decision, the Merck court relied on SRI Int’l, Inc. v. 
Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997).   
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increasingly concerned about diminishing returns, the expensive nature 
of drug development, and spiraling costs of litigation, their attorneys 
need to be creative with their damages theories in order to maximize 
recovery and help their clients recoup the investments in research and 
development necessary to bring new and innovative drugs to the 
marketplace, which investments of time and money have been estimated 
to reach twelve years121 and $800 million,122 respectively.  This article 
suggests a novel theory of willful infringement in order for a patent 
owner to recover treble damages and attorneys’ fees. 
¶58 Toward that end, the decision in Merck gives fodder for the 
argument that the Orange Book provides notice sufficient to trigger 
willfulness where there is infringing commercial activity.  This is 
especially true when Merck is read in conjunction with the Federal 
Circuit’s 2004 decision in Knorr-Bremse reaffirming an affirmative duty 
“to avoid infringement of the known patent rights of others”123 and the 
Federal Circuit’s rebuke of “when widespread disregard of patent rights 
was undermining the national innovation incentive.”124 
¶59 In conceding that the Orange Book “informs the public of the 
patent’s existence,”125 the Merck decision arguably allows a finding of 
willfulness based on a defendant’s notice of a patent via the Orange 
Book.  Moreover, the district court in Merck noted the contention that the 
Orange Book gives “notice to an audience that is required by statute to 
seek out and heed that notice,” the “defendants were required to consult 
the Orange Book under the relevant statutory scheme, and had they done 
so they would have received notice.”126  Admittedly, the court found this 
evidence to “focus on the defendants’ actions.”127 
                                                     
121 Andrew J. Paprocki, Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc.: Can 
the Patent-Term Extension of the Hatch-Waxman Act Be Used as Leverage in 
Drug Patent Infringement Settlements?, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 471, 474 (Summer 
2006).  
122 Daniel F. Couglin, Ph.D., & Rochelle A. Dede, Hatch-Waxman Game-
Playing from a Generic Manufacturer Perspective: From Ticlid® to 
Pravachol®, Apotex has Difficulty Telling Who’s on First, 25 BIOTECHNOLOGY 
L. REP. 525, 526 n.9 (October 2006). 
123 Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 
1337, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
124 In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).  
125 Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 257, 264 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).  
126 Id.  
127 Id. at 265. 
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¶60 While the court granted defendants’ motion, the court did not 
reach the issue of willfulness.  Instead, the motion was brought under 
§ 287(a), and the court held that the “defendants’ knowledge of the 
patent’s existence is simply irrelevant to the notice determination” under 
the marking statute.128 
¶61 Yet, the notice to the defendants in Merck is fundamental to a 
determination of willful infringement129 and the “objectively high 
likelihood that its actions would constitute infringement of a valid 
patent.”130   
¶62 Notice for purposes of willful infringement focuses on a 
defendant’s knowledge of the patent.  Also, notice is evidence that an 
unjustifiably high risk of infringement, when objectively assessed, was 
known or so obvious to the defendant that it should have been known.  
This is true whether the defendant arrives at that knowledge by an 
engineer’s memorandum or by an information disclosure statement the 
defendant files in its own patent application for an invention unrelated to 
the accused product.131  Merck may be read to open the door to a plaintiff 
pleading a willfulness theory that a defendant who reviews the Orange 
Book is found to possess knowledge of the patent’s existence leading to 
an objectively high risk of willful infringement when coupled with 
infringing commercial activity. 
3. Seagate Technology and the “Standards of Commerce” 
¶63 Seagate Technology sent a message that “standards of behavior 
by which a possible infringer evaluates adverse patents should be the 
standards of fair commerce, including reasonableness of the actions 
taken in the particular circumstances.”132  If precautions by a defendant 
are intentionally deficient, then courts ought to adjust accountability, not 
to deny the opportunity to prove willfulness altogether. 
¶64 “Willful” infringement should cover both knowing and reckless 
disregard of the law.  Knowing violations are sensibly understood as 
                                                     
128 Id. 
129 nCube Corp. v. Seachange Int’l, Inc., 436 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2006).  
130 In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
131 SRI Int’l v. Advanced Tech. Labs., 127 F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(finding actual notice when defendant’s “engineers expressed their concerns” 
about the patent in a memorandum); see also Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton 
Sundstrand Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1037 (D. Del. 2001) (finding that a 
reference in defendant’s files to the patent satisfied notice requirement for 
willfulness).   
132 Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1385 (Newman, J., concurring); see also id. at 
1371 n.5.   
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more serious than reckless ones.  Actions falling within the “knowing” 
category include a defendant’s knowing failure to comply with the 
Hatch-Waxman Act133 and intentionally violating the Act by not 
consulting (or reviewing and ignoring) the Orange Book and thereby 
showing an objectively high risk of infringement rather than the 
defendant being “merely careless.”134   
¶65 In the recklessness category, the Federal Circuit understood that 
“recklessness” is a word whose construction often depends on the 
context in which it appears.  A company would not be acting recklessly if 
it diligently and in good faith attempted to fulfill its statutory obligations 
under the Hatch-Waxman Act and simply came to an incorrect 
conclusion.135  But a deliberate and objectively reckless failure to 
comply with the Hatch-Waxman Act in determining the extent of its 
obligations ought not to evade liability under § 284 any more than “bad 
faith infringement.”136  Any other reading of Seagate Technology leaves 
a loophole for paying mere lip-service to the Hatch-Waxman Act, the 
costs of which would be too high. 
¶66 Instead, courts should entertain theories enhancing 
accountability rather than denying plaintiffs the tools they need to 
demonstrate an objectively-defined risk (determined by the record after 
discovery) and to show the risk “was either known or so obvious that it 
should have been known to the accused infringer.”137  Therefore, 
recklessness might turn on circumstances showing the defendant acted in 
reckless disregard of patent rights in violation of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act.138 
¶67 This construction of “objective recklessness” comports with 
common law usage endorsed by the Federal Circuit in Seagate 
                                                     
133 Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2208 (2007) (“[W]here 
willfulness is a statutory condition of civil liability, we have generally taken it to 
cover not only knowing violations of a standard, but reckless ones as well.”)  
134 Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1384 (Gajarsa, J., concurring); see also id. at 1381 
(Supreme Court cases “do not hold that a finding of willfulness is necessary to 
support an award of enhanced damages.  At most, those cases merely stand for 
the uncontroversial proposition that a finding of willfulness is sufficient to 
support an award of enhanced damages.”) (emphasis in original). 
135 Cf. Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1384 (A defendant’s actions must be “not only 
incorrect, but [] objectively unreasonable.”). 
136 Id. at 1368 (“[B]ad faith infringement” is “a type of willful infringement.”). 
137 Id. at 1371.   
138 The Federal Circuit did not set forth an absolute definition of the term 
“reckless” but instead emphasized that the term would be developed by future 
cases.  Id. at 1371, 1385. 
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Technology, which cited both Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts139 and 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.140  The Restatement, for example, 
defines recklessness in terms of an actor’s conduct as “reckless 
disregard” when the actor does an act or “intentionally fails” to do an act 
that it is duty-bound to do, “knowing or having reason to know of facts” 
that would lead a “reasonable” person to appreciate the risk as 
substantially greater then simple negligence.141 
¶68 Hence, recklessness may consist of either of two different types 
of conduct.  In one, the actor knows or has reason to know of facts that 
create a high degree of risk, but acts or fails to act “in conscious 
disregard of, or indifference to, that risk.”142 For the other type of 
recklessness, the actor either knows, or has “reason to know, the facts, 
but does not realize or appreciate the high degree of risk involved,” 
although a reasonable person would appreciate the risk.143 
¶69 After all, when a defendant intentionally violates the Hatch-
Waxman Act by failing to comply with its duty to check the Orange 
Book (or by disregarding the results if it does check the Orange Book) 
and there is a strong probability that the defendant knew or should have 
known of an unreasonably high risk of infringement, then the 
defendant’s conscious choice involves a risk substantially greater than 
mere negligence.144  Simply put, the defendant cannot stick its head in 
                                                     
139 Id. at 1371 (citing W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS § 34, 212-14 (5th ed. 1984)). 
140 Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1371 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 500 (1965)).  
141 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 500 (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT 
SECOND]; see also W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS § 34, 213 (5th ed. 1984)) [hereinafter PROSSER] 
(permitting recklessness to be found when there is evidence of “a known or 
obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that the harm would 
follow”).   
142 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 500 cmt. A (1965).   
143 Id.  An objective standard is applied to this second type of recklessness, and 
the actor is “held to the realization of the aggravated risk.” Id. 
144 The American Law Institute has approved the proposed final draft (issued on 
April 6, 2006) of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS (2007) [hereinafter 
RESTATEMENT THIRD].  Unlike § 500 of the RESTATEMENT SECOND cited by the 
Federal Circuit in Seagate, supra notes 140–141, which does not require the 
actor’s actual knowledge of the risks (instead, requiring at least actual 
knowledge of facts leading a reasonable person to realize the risks), Section 2 of 
the RESTATEMENT THIRD defines “recklessness” to require knowledge of facts 
making the risk of infringement “obvious” to a person or business subject to the 
Hatch-Waxman Act:   
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the sand, and then walk away from all accountability.  The result would 
undermine the public’s confidence in the Hatch-Waxman Act and would 
do little to enhance the public image of the patent system as a whole.    
III. SYNTHESIS OF WILLFUL PATENT INFRINGEMENT UNDER THE 
NOVEL ORANGE BOOK NOTICE THEORY 
¶70 It is common advice to check under the hood before buying a 
used car.  Asserting a pharmaceutical patent should be no different, 
although practitioners overlooked the advantages of using the Orange 
Book and the ANDA process to establish a theory of willfulness.  This 
section looks under the hood by exploring how the novel Orange Book 
theory of proving willfulness will work in practice. 
A. The Orange Book Theory and Hatch-Waxman Act 
¶71 Since 2004, there is a split of authority concerning willful patent 
infringement in the context of the Hatch-Waxman Act.145  This chasm 
will grow until it reaches the Federal Circuit, thereby making the novel 
Orange Book theory quite timely. 
¶72 Plainly stated, the “mere” filing of an ANDA does not—taken 
alone—constitute grounds for finding willful infringement.  Indeed, this 
was the 2004 Federal Circuit holding in Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, 
Inc.: “[W]e now hold that the mere fact that a company has filed an 
                                                                                                                       
A person acts recklessly in engaging in conduct if:  
(a) the person knows of the risk of harm created by the conduct or knows facts 
that make the risk obvious to another in the person’s situation, and  
(b) the precaution that would eliminate or reduce the risk involves burdens that 
are so slight relative to the magnitude of the risk as to render the person’s 
failure to adopt the precaution a demonstration of the person’s indifference to 
the risk.  
RESTATEMENT THIRD, § 2.  Therefore, both the Second and Third Restatements 
support the “Orange Book” theory of willful patent infringement asserted by this 
article.  
145 Celgene Corp. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 439 (D.N.J. 2006) 
(“District courts that have addressed the issue have disagreed as to whether or 
not there can be a finding of willful infringement based upon the filing of an 
ANDA and Paragraph IV Certification.”); Boehringer Ingelheim Int’l GMBH v. 
Barr Labs., Inc., No. 05-700, 2006 WL 1876918, at *2 (D. Del. July 6, 2006) 
(“The district courts have split on the issue.”); Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Teva 
Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 05-1887, 2005 WL 3664014, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 
2005) (Although “Glaxo stands for the proposition that an ANDA filing, without 
more, does not constitute willful infringement, it is possible that Novartis may 
be able to show activity in addition to the ANDA filing to support the issue of 
willfulness.”). 
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ANDA application or certification cannot support a finding of willful 
infringement for purposes of awarding attorneys’ fees pursuant to 35 
U.S.C. § 271(e)(4).”146  Since this ruling, the Federal Circuit has not 
expounded further on Glaxo or the intersection between willfulness and 
the Hatch-Waxman Act.147 
¶73 A fair reading of Glaxo, however, is that the Federal Circuit 
simply recognized the fact that there was no patent infringement by the 
“mere”148 filing of an ANDA or Paragraph IV certification.  For this 
reason, the Supreme Court earlier emphasized that patent litigation 
initiated in federal courts under §§ 271(e)(2) and (e)(4) constitutes 
“highly artificial” acts of infringement simply as a vehicle to serve the 
“very limited and technical purpose” of creating jurisdiction under the 
fiction of an act of infringement (i.e., “to enable the judicial adjudication 
upon which the ANDA and paper NDA schemes depend”).149  The 
Glaxo court acknowledged that § 271(e) of the Patent Act was “primarily 
a jurisdictional-conferring statute that establishes a case or controversy in 
a declaratory judgment action.”150  In fact, the Federal Circuit recently 
made it easier to file declaratory judgment actions in ANDA cases,151 
                                                     
146 376 F.3d 1339, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2004).   
147 Since handing down Glaxo, the Federal Circuit has only cited to that decision 
on three occasions.  In all three cases, Glaxo was cited for its discussion of 
patent invalidity in general, and in particular the high burden of proving 
invalidity based on prior art references that were before the examiner during 
prosecution.  Haberman v. Gerber Prods. Co., Nos. 2006–1490 & 1516, 2007 
WL 1577970, at *4 (Fed. Cir. May 29, 2007) (not selected for publication); 
Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007); 
Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2006).   
148 Glaxo, 376 F.3d at 1350–51.   
149 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 674–78 (1990); see also 
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Novartix Pharms. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1334 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007) (“Teva’s paragraph IV certifications constitute technical infringement 
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).”). 
150 Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 376 F.3d 1339, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
151 Teva, 482 F.3d at 1340–45; see also SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, 
Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  In lowering the standard for patent 
declaratory judgment actions, both Teva and SanDisk relied on footnote 11 from 
the Supreme Court’s decision in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 
764, 774 n.11 (2007).  See Teva, 482 F.3d at 1339 (“In MedImmune, the 
Supreme Court in a detailed footnote stated that our two-prong ‘reasonable 
apprehension of suit’ test ‘conflicts’ and would ‘contradict’ several cases in 
which the Supreme Court found that a declaratory judgment plaintiff had a 
justiciable controversy.”); SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1379; see also SanDisk, 482 
F.3d at 1384 (Bryson, J., concurring) (“The decision in MedImmune dealt with a 
narrow issue. . . . Footnote 11 of the MedImmune opinion, however, went further 
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and by doing so, expressly recognized that the listing of patents “in the 
Orange Book . . . represents that a claim of patent infringement could 
reasonably be asserted if a person not licensed by the owner engaged in 
the manufacture, use or sale of generic [drugs] covered by the claims of 
its listed [drug] patents.”152 
¶74 Notwithstanding its “mere” filing holding, the Glaxo court 
recognized that, even in cases initiated solely based on the defendant’s 
filing of an ANDA or Paragraph IV certification, a district court may 
declare the case “exceptional” under 35 U.S.C. § 285.153  Section 285 
permits an award to the patent owner of its attorneys’ fees resulting from 
“litigation misconduct such as vexatious or unjustified litigation or 
frivolous filings, and willful infringement.”154  Thus, even under Glaxo, 
district courts may consider willfulness, provided the allegation does not 
rest solely on the filing of an ANDA or Paragraph IV certification, such 
as in determining whether to award attorneys’ fees.155  In assessing 
whether a case is exceptional for purposes of awarding attorneys’ fees, a 
court “must look at the totality of the circumstances.”156 
¶75 The Glaxo court also left open the possibility that filing an 
ANDA in combination with other factors should allow a brand-name 
drug manufacturer to plead both willful infringement as well as 
                                                                                                                       
and criticized this court’s ‘reasonable apprehension of suit’ test for declaratory 
judgment jurisdiction.”).  
152 Teva, 482 F.3d at 1341. 
153 Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 376 F.3d 1339, 1350 Fed. Cir. 2004). 
154 Id. (emphasis added).  The Federal Circuit in Glaxo emphasized that a 
declaratory judgment action alleging anticipatory infringement based on an 
ANDA was an “artificial” infringement for purposes of establishing jurisdiction:    
Because 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) is designed to create an artificial act of 
infringement for purposes of establishing jurisdiction in the federal courts, we 
hold that the district court committed clear legal error in finding that Apotex’s 
mere filing of an ANDA could form the basis of a willful infringement finding 
. . . [S]uch a filing cannot constitute willful infringement for purposes of 
establishing an exceptional case and the award of attorney’s fees under 35 
U.S.C. § 271(e)(4).  
Glaxo, 376 F.3d at 1351 (emphasis in original).   
155 Glaxo, 376 F.3d at 1350–51. 
156 Yamanouchi Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F.3d 1339, 
1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming a district court’s finding that the case was 
“exceptional” based on an ANDA filing that was “without adequate foundation 
and speculative at best”).  The defendant had failed to present a prima facie case 
of invalidity in filing its Paragraph IV certification, and proceeded with 
litigation despite “glaring weaknesses” in its case.  Id. at 1347–48; see also 
supra Part I.A (discussing the factors for determining willful infringement). 
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attorneys’ fees.  On the one hand, the Federal Circuit arguably foreclosed 
a finding of willful infringement when based “merely” on the filing of 
the ANDA.157  On the other hand, a patent owner should have the 
opportunity to establish facts supporting a claim that the “only” act of 
infringement alleged in the complaint is not simply the defendant’s mere 
filing of an ANDA. 
¶76 For example, Glaxo arguably recognizes that a claim for willful 
infringement may be pleaded “when commercial activity has actually 
occurred in the United States or when the commercial product has been 
imported.”158  Indeed, it would turn Hatch-Waxman on its head to permit 
a defendant to file an ANDA and engage in pre-filing or post-filing 
“commercial activity” or importing a “commercial product” with 
impunity. 
¶77 Just how much commercial activity is necessary or when a 
commercial product is deemed imported remains an open issue.  Will it 
be enough to “copy” the patentee’s drug or combine an ANDA with one 
or more of the nine factors considered under the “totality of 
circumstances”?159  Will it be enough to promote a generic version on 
the defendant’s website?160  An intriguing Pandora’s box opened by the 
Federal Circuit’s highly publicized decision in NTP, Inc. v. Research in 
Motion, Ltd.,161 is the extraterritorial reach of the Patent Act.162  In NTP, 
                                                     
157 Glaxo, 376 F.3d at 1350–51. 
158 Id. at 1350. 
159 Deliberate copying is one of the nine factors considered under the “totality of 
circumstances.”  Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., 449 F.3d 1209, 1225 
(Fed. Cir. 2006).   
160 Borrowing from the context of § 287(a), a website is arguably a “tangible” 
item.  Soverain Software L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 2d 904, 909 
(E.D. Tex. 2005) (“[T]he Court . . . defines ‘tangible item[s],’ as used in 
Am[erican] Medical Systems, as those items that can be marked and intangible 
items as those that cannot be marked.”  Applying that definition, the court found 
screen shots of a website to be a tangible item.) (citing Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. 
Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1538–39 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).    
161 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1174 (2006). 
162 Commentators debate whether there may ever be extraterritorial enforcement 
of intellectual property laws under U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  Compare John 
W. Osborne, A Rational Analytical Boundary for Determination of Infringement 
by Extraterritorially-Distributed Systems, 46 IDEA 587 (2006) (arguing that, 
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c), (f), (g) (2000), a foreign defendant of an 
extraterritorially-distributed telecommunications system cannot infringe the 
patent if its activities relating to the patentably distinctive aspect of the claimed 
invention did not take place in the United States) with Christopher A. Harkins, 
Overcoming the Extraterritorial Bar to Bringing Copyright Actions: On 
 31
2007 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 6 
the Federal Circuit applied § 271(a) to accused products and systems 
distributed extraterritorially by focusing on the “place at which the 
system as a whole is put into service,” the “place where control of the 
system is exercised,” and the place where “beneficial use of the system 
[is] obtained.”163  According to the court, the fact that one element of the 
system claims took place “in Canada did not, as a matter of law, preclude 
infringement of the asserted system claims” by Research in Motion.164 
¶78 Patent attorneys have sat by idly when merely asserting a 
defendant’s ANDA or Paragraph IV certification as a basis for 
jurisdiction and the limited relief under § 271(e).  In a case where there is 
commercial activity or a commercial product, however, the patent 
owner’s willful infringement claim no longer rests entirely on the “mere 
filing”165 of an ANDA.  The defendant’s knowledge of the asserted 
patent, whether from the Orange Book or otherwise, and a showing that 
its actions constitute “objective recklessness,”166 are relevant to the 
totality of circumstances and to the time-honored duty to avoid willful 
infringement. 
B. The Orange Book Theory and Traditional Infringement 
¶79 The Glaxo decision seems to have set many in the patent 
community buzzing about a perceived deathblow to willful infringement 
pharmaceutical litigation.  But there is a different way of looking at the 
Glaxo decision:  The Federal Circuit was simply recognizing the “highly 
artificial” act of infringement as a necessary requirement for satisfying 
justiciability when the generic companies “have not yet infringed the 
patents in issue.”167 
¶80 Once defendants have committed at least one primary act of 
patent infringement, however, then the Glaxo decision ought not apply.  
In other words, a claim for willful infringement should be actionable 
                                                                                                                       
Pleading Copyright Infringement to Protect Copyrighted Works from the 
Defendant that Ships Overseas for Distribution Abroad, 17 INTELL. PROP. & 
TECH. L.J. 1, 7 (May 2005) (noting the extraterritorial bar to bringing copyright 
infringement suits but arguing for an exception to that rule, because “[w]hen 
defendants have committed at least one primary act of copyright infringement in 
the United States, the presumption against extraterritoriality ought not to defeat 
a court’s subject matter jurisdiction”).   
163 NTP, 418 F.3d at 1317.   
164 Id. 
165 Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 376 F.3d 1339, 1342, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 
2004).  
166 In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).  
167 Glaxo, 376 F.3d at 1351 (emphasis added). 
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under the Patent Act and Federal Circuit precedent, if the willfulness 
claim is not based solely on defendants’ filing of an ANDA.168  The 
bottom line is:  Look under the hood of that used car for evidence of 
infringement.  Also, a patent owner should learn to plead offensively to 
rebut a future motion to dismiss a claim of willful infringement, which 
facts may otherwise escape the complaint in favor of clutching to the 
more habitual practice of notice pleading.169 
¶81 Consequently, a patent owner may affirmatively plead theories 
of direct infringement when the defendant is offering to sell, selling, or 
importing into the United States any product that embodies the patented 
invention.170  Or the patent owner may seek to hold the defendant liable 
under a theory of indirect infringement,171 such as by inducement of 
infringement172 or by contributory infringement.173 
                                                     
168 The plaintiff should be allowed to develop evidence necessary to show a 
primary act of infringement.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) (1987).  Rule 56(f) 
provides a non-movant with protection from being “railroaded” by a defendant’s 
premature motion for summary judgment.  Opryland USA, Inc. v. Great Am. 
Music Show, Inc., 970 F.2d 847, 852 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
169 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), (e) (1987); see also HARKINS, supra note 162, at 4 
(“Rather than abiding by that longstanding rule, fact pleading (as opposed to 
federal notice pleading) should be considered.  Indeed, using an appropriate 
level of fact pleading in a well-pleaded complaint may dissuade motion practice 
. . . as well as help to broaden the scope of allowable discovery.”). 
170 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (“Except as otherwise provided in this title, 
whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented 
invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any 
patented invention during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the 
patent.”). 
171 The Federal Circuit uses the term “indirect infringement” to describe active 
inducement of infringement or contributory infringement.  DSU Med. Corp. v. 
JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, 
Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 774 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Furthermore, “the patentee always has 
the burden to show direct infringement for each instance of indirect 
infringement.”  DSU, 471 F.3d at 1303; see also Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T 
Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1751 & n.2 (2007) (Without direct infringement, there 
can be no inducing or contributing to an infringement.). 
172 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (1952) (“Whoever actively induces infringement of a 
patent shall be liable as an infringer.”).  There can be no inducement to infringe 
a patent unless the defendant “knew of the patent.”  DSU, 471 F.3d at 1304.  
Once the defendant “knew” of the patent, the defendant must “actively and 
knowingly” aid and abet another’s direct infringement—knowledge of another’s 
acts (alleged to be infringing the patent) is not enough to show “specific intent 
and action to induce infringement.”  Id. at 1305 (emphasis in original).  The 
defendant’s state of mind must show the defendant “knowingly induced 
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¶82 For example, the first decision expressly dealing with marking in 
the context of the Orange Book was Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health 
Consulting, Inc.174  In Merck, defendants operated Canadian-based 
Internet pharmacies, promoted their products in the United States via 
their websites, and sold, offered for sale, or promoted generic versions of 
plaintiff’s patented drug to defendants’ customers in the United States 
through the Internet.175  Furthermore, all of the defendants knowingly 
sold and advertised the accused generic drugs in the United States 
without FDA approval.176 
¶83 Under those circumstances, the defendants arguably can be said 
to commit at least one primary act of patent infringement.177  
Consequently, they should not be allowed to rely on the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, which limits a plaintiff’s remedy to declaratory relief, to avoid 
damages stemming from patent infringement liability.  Plainly stated, 
                                                                                                                       
infringement, not merely knowingly induced the acts that constitute direct 
infringement.”  Id. at 1306 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).  In other 
words, “the inducer must have an affirmative intent to cause direct 
infringement.”  Id.; see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936 (2005). 
173 The statutory source for contributory infringement is § 271(c):  
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the 
United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination 
or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented 
process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be 
especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such 
patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for 
substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.  
35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006); see also DSU, 471 F.3d at 1303 (Contributory 
infringement requires a plaintiff to prove that the defendant made or sold the 
accused product, that no substantial non-infringing uses existed, that the 
defendant’s acts of contributory infringement occurred within the United States, 
and that an act of direct infringement was made within the United States.); 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 932 (2005) 
(stating that one who sells articles for use in a patented combination will be 
“presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts; he will be presumed to 
intend that they shall be used in the combination of the patent”).   
174 434 F. Supp. 2d 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
175 Id. at 260. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 266 (“Accordingly, defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment 
is granted only with respect to any claims for injunctive relief and damages 
resulting from purported infringement following patent expiration.”); see also 
id. at 263 n.5 (acknowledging the plaintiffs’ allegations of patent infringement 
based on product and method claims). 
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defendants who have not complied with the Hatch-Waxman Act should 
not benefit from it.  Conversely, if defendants complied with US law and 
filed an ANDA before selling or promoting drugs in the US during the 
term of the asserted patent, then Merck might be limited to declaratory 
relief under Hatch-Waxman.  The defendants in that scenario, however, 
were not selling infringing products and the issue of damages and a claim 
of willful infringement would never arise. 
¶84 Moreover, there is an “obligation”178 to consult the Orange Book 
before promoting, selling, or offering for sale generic medication 
regulated by the FDA.  Use of a patented invention constitutes 
infringement, and knowledge of the patent triggers a duty to avoid 
directly and indirectly infringing the claims of the patent.179  And as a 
practical matter, sellers of generic versions of brand-name drugs can 
hardly dispute they were unaware of the plaintiff’s product—after all, 
their business models encourage Americans to save money on 
prescriptions by switching from the more costly brand-name drugs to 
their more affordable generic drugs.  In most cases, defendants 
acknowledge on their websites that their products are equivalent, safe, 
and as effective as the brand-name drug.180 
¶85 Consequently, once a defendant has committed a primary act of 
infringement in the prescription-drug arena, the patent owner should be 
                                                     
178 Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 376 F.3d 1339, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(“[A] generic company has an obligation to consult the Orange Book”).  
179 See supra Part I.A and II.B.3 (Discussing case law holding that patent 
infringement is a strict liability offense and that the accused infringer has a duty 
to investigate and avoid willful infringement); see also supra notes 171–74 
(discussing case law relating to indirect infringement theories such as 
inducement of infringement and contributory infringement).  
180 If an ANDA were filed, then the generic-drug company’s offers represent 
therapeutic equivalence under the Hatch-Waxman Act and relies on the new 
drug applicant’s full reports demonstrating safety and effectiveness.  21 U.S.C. 
§ 505 (2006).  Even when a generic-drug company sells without filing an 
ANDA, as in Merck, the company is likely to boast equivalence to, without the 
price of, brand-name pharmaceuticals.  Indeed, in Merck & Co. v. Mediplan 
Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), a companion 
opinion to the Merck decision discussed above but relating to the allegations of 
unfair competition, the district court described how the defendants’ websites 
offered generic versions of plaintiff’s popular cholesterol medication, Zocor, 
and did so “to identify their products as more affordable generic versions of 
Zocor,” id. at 406, advertised as “safe affordable” alternatives, id. at 407, and 
used Merck’s Zocor work mark in connection with their advertisements, id. at 
408–09. 
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allowed to assert a claim for willful infringement181 and to pursue that 
theory in discovery.182  Otherwise, there is a highly irregular disconnect 
whereby defendants may eschew both the FDA and patent laws on the 
one hand, and attempt to shield from discovery evidence of blatant 
copying and intentional disregard for the patent on the other.  Such a 
result would undercut the policy of the Patent Act that patents constitute 
rights of exclusivity,183 that there be a “remedy by civil action for 
infringement” of a patent,184 and that the patent owner be awarded 
damages adequate to compensate the owner for the infringement, but in 
no event less than a reasonable royalty, treble damages,185 and attorneys’ 
fees if the case is exceptional.186 
¶86 Therefore, when a potential plaintiff performs the necessary pre-
filing investigation187 of the would-be defendant’s commercial activities 
and commercial product before bringing a claim for patent infringement, 
                                                     
181 In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) 
(“However, when a complaint is filed, a patentee must have a good faith basis 
for alleging willful infringement.  Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8, 11(b).  So a willfulness 
claim asserted in the original complaint must necessarily be grounded 
exclusively in the accused infringer’s pre-filing conduct.”).    
182 As antecedent to the issue of willfulness before it, a court may consider 
allowing a plaintiff discovery relating to willful infringement.  Seagate Tech., 
497 F.3d 1371–72 (“The ultimate dispute in this case is the proper scope of 
discovery.  While it is true that the issue of willful infringement, or even 
infringement for that matter, has not been decided by the trial court, it is 
indisputable that the proper legal standard for willful infringement informs the 
relevance of evidence relating to that issue and, more importantly here, the 
proper scope of discovery.”). 
183 35 U.S.C. 154 (2006) (Every patent shall grant to the patentee the “right to 
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention 
throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United 
States.”); 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006) (“patents shall have attributes of personal 
property”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“[S]ecuring for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their Respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”).   
184 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2006). 
185 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (“[T]he court may increase the damages up to three 
times the amount found or assessed.”). 
186 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006) (“The court in exceptional cases may award 
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”). 
187 View Eng’g, Inc. v. Robotic Vision Sys., Inc., 208 F.3d 981, 986 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) (“In bringing a claim for infringement, the patent holder, if challenged, 
must be prepared to demonstrate to both the court and the alleged infringer 
exactly why it believed before filing the claim that it had a reasonable chance of 
proving infringement.”). 
 36
2007 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 6 
consider drafting the complaint with an eye toward the nine non-
exclusive factors that make up the “totality of the circumstances”188 for 
proving willful infringement.  After all, the Federal Circuit considers 
willfulness to be one of degree: “Willfulness in infringement, as in life, is 
not an all-or-nothing trait, but one of degree.  It recognizes that 
infringement may range from unknowing, or accidental, to deliberate, or 
reckless, disregard of a patentee’s legal rights.”189 
¶87 Patent infringement is a strict-liability action requiring no intent 
or wrongdoing on the part of the defendant,190 but an act of infringement 
rarely exists in a vacuum.  When coupled with just one of the nine 
factors, perhaps a plaintiff might not be alerted to willfulness.  When a 
potential plaintiff can show two factors in addition to the infringement, a 
warning flag should be raised in the plaintiff’s mind.  And when there are 
three or more factors, the flag should start waving back and forth. 
¶88 However, one never reaches the totality of circumstances, 
objective recklessness, and ultimately willfulness without showing the 
defendant had notice of the patent.191  Why settle on the date when the 
patent infringement complaint was filed?  At the very least, give thought 
to bringing the date back to when the defendant first possessed actual 
knowledge of the asserted patent—the date when, according to its legal 
obligation or business practice, the defendant checked the Orange Book.  
When the dust settles, the Orange Book might very well entitle the patent 
owner to damages from the inception of the defendant’s infringing 
activities. 
CONCLUSION 
¶89 The debate about willful infringement under the Hatch-Waxman 
Act is represented by strong advocacy on opposing sides.192  One side 
                                                     
188 See supra text accompanying notes 28–29 (Listing nine factors that comprise 
the totality of circumstances; see also Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer 
Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1342–43 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(en banc) (“Determination of willfulness is made on consideration of the totality 
of the circumstances, and may include contributions of several factors . . . .  
These contributions are evaluated and weighed by the trier of fact.”) (citations 
omitted). 
189 Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1343. 
190 In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc); 
Hilton Davis Chem Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1527 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (en banc). 
191 See supra Part I.B and notes 56–71 (discussing cases addressing the types of 
notice necessary and sufficient to create a duty to avoid willful infringement). 
192 See supra Part II.A and note 94.   
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sets the bar very high, such that willfulness damages are never available.  
These advocates claim the Hatch-Waxman policy in favor of cheaper, 
generic copies of drugs should carry the day.  Brand-name 
manufacturers, on the other side, warn that an absolute bar against 
willfulness damages will stymie research.  They would call for 
willfulness damages in order to promote the Hatch-Waxman policy 
encouraging new drug development.  This article seeks a carefully 
crafted balance by focusing on the public interest that lies somewhere 
between those two equally important sides.   
¶90 Accordingly, in the high stakes of brand-name versus generic-
drug litigation, plaintiffs bringing patent infringement actions can be 
expected to start testing the theory of whether (and to what extent) the 
Orange Book provides “notice” of the asserted patents.  First, plaintiffs 
may argue the Orange Book fully serves the purpose of notifying 
potential infringers that the would-be defendants’ generic drugs will 
infringe the listed patents for purpose of the notice requirements under 
§ 287(a). 
¶91 Second, the Merck193 case—and its nascent theory of asserting 
“notice” based on the Orange Book—has a potentially far-reaching 
impact on willful infringement.  Future plaintiffs might develop a theory 
of willful infringement by arguing the Orange Book provides direct and 
specific notice to a unique audience required by statute to seek out and 
heed the notice that generic drugs will infringe the patents listed within.  
Consequently, defendants who consult the Orange Book would be under 
a duty to avoid infringing a patent relevant to their products.  If the 
defendants are found to have willfully failed to comply with (or to be in 
reckless disregard of) this duty and “standards of commerce,”194 there 
may be a determination of willful infringement and a finding that they 
owe treble damages and attorneys’ fees. 
¶92 As one contemplates these novel theories, one should not lose 
sight of the price paid for innovation, which the Hatch-Waxman Act 
seeks to encourage.  Indeed, achievements have not always resulted in 
immediate commercial success, but resulting in expensive undertakings 
and long-term investments.  More precisely, innovative pharmaceutical 
companies may spend as much as a dozen years and $800 million to 
                                                     
193 Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 2d 257 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
194 In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) 
(In recognizing that the “objective recklessness” standard of willfulness is not 
self-defining, the Federal Circuit stated:  “We would expect, as suggested by 
Judge Newman, that the standards of commerce would be among the factors a 
court might consider.”) (internal citation omitted). 
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bring a pioneering drug to the market,195 and FDA-required testing at 
times effectively reduces the life of patent protection to seven years or 
less.196  Moreover, the compromise leading to the Hatch-Waxman Act 
was intended to facilitate and expedite generic-drug market entry without 
harming, and indeed while concurrently safeguarding, pharmaceutical 
companies bringing new and innovative drugs to the marketplace. 
¶93 Only a year ago, who thought Wal-Mart would offer four dollar 
prescriptions for generic drugs?  Tomorrow, Wal-Mart might become the 
Spacely Space Sprockets of generic-drug prescriptions.  When generic 
drugs fly off the shelves faster than the speed of light, brand-name 
pharmaceutical companies are slowed by plunking down hefty sums in 
R&D necessary to develop innovative drugs that foster the high standard 
of living in America as well as to help developing countries in need of 
better medicine. 
¶94 To stay competitive, stimulate invention of new products, and 
innovate ways to save and improve lives, pioneering drug manufacturers 
must look to the courts more than ever for patent protection, injunctive 
relief, and money damages that help to underwrite costly research.  
Therefore, to offset the generic’s edge, a budding theory of Orange Book 
notice and willfulness might well be the innovator’s diamond in the 
rough. 
                                                     
195 See Paprocki, supra note 121, at 474; Couglin & Dede, supra note 122, at 
526 n.9. 
196 Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 864 (Fed. Cir. 1984).  
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